22 posts categorized "Physician Compensation"

April 20, 2010

Compensation concepts

Your group's compensation formula may be its most jealously guarded sacred cow. Whether sensible or not, it continues in place as long as members don't object. And your members will likely not object as long as the pot of available income keeps growing. Despite the possible upheaval, it's time to reconsider partner pay. These five basic principles form the foundation of any income division format you design:

  • Group members must trust the income division process and the people implementing it
  • The formula must be reasonably simple and clearly understood
  • The formula must provide some equity, although each member may not necessarily be treated equally
  • Include proper incentive to work for the growth of the group, and promote practice goals
  • The members must offer fair evaluations of each other and the practice's needs

March 29, 2010

Compensation concepts

Your group's compensation formula may be its most jealously guarded sacred cow. Whether sensible or not, it continues in place as long as members don't object. And your members will likely not object as long as the pot of available income keeps growing. Despite the possible upheaval, it's time to reconsider partner pay. These five basic principles form the foundation of any income division format you design:

  • Group members must trust the income division process and the people implementing it
  • The formula must be reasonably simple and clearly understood
  • The formula must provide some equity, although each member may not necessarily be treated equally
  • Include proper incentive to work for the growth of the group, and promote practice goals
  • The members must offer fair evaluations of each other and the practice's needs

 

March 16, 2010

Incentive pitfalls in physician hospital employment agreements

More and more physicians are seeking hospital employment. Health care reform and widely anticipated federal Medicare reimbursement cuts are fueling another round of physician employment fever in hospitals.  Some observers predict that as many as eighty five percent of physicians will be hospital employees in the next ten years. There seems little doubt that there will be tremendous pressure from a variety of sources to rein in unrestricted “fee for service” retail medical practices in the future.

Many hospitals that toyed with physician practice acquisitions in the 1990s, found that they were ill equipped and inept in the management of physician practices. They didn’t understand the physician motivation, culture and mindset. They turned many of the acquired practices into non-performing assets. One of the major mistakes was the lack of incentive for physicians to perform. Greg Piche of Holland & Hart (http://www.hollandharthealthcare.com/) reminds us of these three major incentive pitfalls experienced by hospital in their physician employment contracts.

1. Failure To Incentivize Productivity . Pure salary contracts isolate a physician from the reality and impact of his or her economic performance. Without a bonus or financial incentive based on Relative Value Units (“RVUs”), collections or other form of personal productivity measure, employed physicians had a compelling tendency to move toward the performance levels of the lowest common denominator. If productivity is not rewarded, it is not valued and it does not materialize. The productivity threshold must be reasonably reachable, otherwise it has the same discouraging impact of no incentive at all.

2. Failure To Collect Physician Revenues . The collection rates for physician practices tend to plummet significantly when the billing and collection is taken over by hospital billing departments. These departments tend to drop below national regional norms for percentage of collections as a ratio of billings. Hospital billing and collection departments often do not grasp the urgency or efficiency of physician billing and followup and a lot of things fall through the cracks. Both hospitals and their employed physicians have an economic interest in the production of physician income revenues consistent with national and regional norms. Failure to fully glean the collection potential of physician billings will reduce hospital revenues, reduce potential physician  bonuses and devastate physician morale. Even those physicians on a fixed salary will be in a diminished bargaining position when contract revision time arrives. While astute negotiation of physician employment agreements can include “cover” for physicians requiring that they be credited for revenues on the basis of historic, national or regional collection percentages, the gulf between physician compensation and tepid collection performance can raise serious tax and regulatory issues as well as internal organizational dissonance. Physician billing and collection should be outsourced if it cannot be efficiently and effectively done in house.

3. Overloading Hospital Cost Structure into Bonus Compensation Formulas . Hospital incentive compensation formulas tend to load physician practice costs into a recovery obligation before bonus incentive compensation is distributed. Hospital overhead, including personnel compensation, rent, management and other costs trend substantially higher than in physician practices. It is not uncommon for hospitals to deduct their higher expense structure costs  as a reduction prior to calculation of physician incentive compensation. Where possible, hospitals should keep the physician expense structure consistent with private practice models. Otherwise the charging of physicians with the hospital expense structure substantially in excess of physician practice norms will chill incentive to produce more. Physician practices need to be mean and lean and hospitals and their employed physicians have an overarching need to keep them so and to reward the reasonable productivity of physicians who generate their revenue, separate and apart from the hospital revenue generated  by physicians, who just happen to be employees.

February 01, 2010

Physician slowing down - compensation issues

How many physician employment contracts contemplate reduced duties prior to retirement? Believe it or not, not as many you might think. The key is that exercising the slow down provision essentially is the physician’s notice of his intent to fully retire within a year or two. Once the physician is no longer bearing a full burden of the work/call, he or she should sell his or her ownership interest and also take a significant pay reduction at the same time.  I have found for example that if the overhead rate is 40% for a general surgery practice, then the physician slowing down should probably paying 50% or 60% effective overhead by the time he or she fully retires.  Years ago I worked with an OB/GYN practice with a 55% overhead rate and a senior guy during his last two years was paying a 70%-75% overhead rate....he was ready to leave by then!

November 04, 2009

Advantages to hospital employment?

Here are a few of the most common advantages I hear out there for a physician’s employment by a hospital:

 

§  A stable financial circumstance, including, but not limited to guaranteed or fixed competitive base compensation and benefits;

§  Access to continuing and reliable malpractice coverage and, in many cases, tail insurance;

§  A practice environment free from the day-to-day burden and administrative tasks of operating and managing an independent practice; and

§  More regular work hours and shared call responsibility.

 

Oh really? What about THE major disadvantage – the hospital controls your compensation now and in to the future. I just hope hospitals have learned from their mistakes in the past but from what I see so far, that is doubtful. Are physicians really better off employed by a hospital rather than go at it as an independent practice? It’s going to be interested to see how all of this is going to shake out.

October 09, 2009

Pay partners for taking on extra duties

Aside from your top physician leader, the increasing complexity of medical practice creates the need for physicians in all size groups to kick in with various aspects of running the practice. From sitting in on an executive committee to heading an important group committee to a major short-term job like selecting a new computer system, one of your own should receive extra pay for doing extra duties.

Often, for small and mid-sized groups, these extra jobs come as part of the partnership territory. But increasingly, partners begin paying for some extra duties as groups grow larger and extra duties become more critical.

October 03, 2009

FMV compensationand work RVUs

Suppose a hospital is proposing a new method compensating its physicians based upon a WRVU (work relative value unit) model. The physicians will be paid a base salary based upon an MGMA survey.  Each physician will be expected to meet the WRVU's associated with that Base Salary and may also bonus by generating WRVU's in excess of the threshold.  Hospital will monitor the physician's production and if at the end of the year it is determined the a physician did not generate the threshold WRVU's to attain the base salary, then he or she will have to repay the excess.

An argument could be made fair market value compensation is determined at the beginning of the contract and therefore if the method of determining compensation is based upon reasonable data from the physician's past production, there should be no pay back if the physician does not meet his/her WRVU threshold.  Does Stark require ongoing monitoring of FMV, just a FMV at the begging of the contract year?

To me, the most important question given these facts below is:  Is the base salary at FMV to begin with?  If so, I do not see the need to have the physician pay back the "excess" should they fail to produce threshold WRVUs.  Yes, there is an economic consequence to allowing the physician's production to fall below the threshold without any impact on the base salary.

It is also extremely impractical to think that the doctors will pay back the “excess” without a fight that will certainly damage the relationship between the hospital and the physicians, as well as other physicians on the medical staff. The best solution is to have a clause in the contract reviewing and re-adjusting the base salary as necessary each year to reflect the FMV for WRVUs produced the prior year.

In other words, any compensation adjustment should be on a prospective basis, not retroactive.

August 21, 2009

Technical revenues, incident to, and Stark

Keep in mind there is an "incident to" aspect of the Stark in office ancillary services exception, the exception that applies to the technical component. As I understand it, if the technical service is "incident to" the physician's professional service, then it can be included in the physician's personal productivity part of the formula. If the technical service is not "incident to" the physician's professional service, then it must be included in the Designated Health Services earnings that are distributed in a manner which does not take into account the volume or value of the physicians' referrals. In distinguishing between technical services that are "incident to" a physician's professional service and ones that are not, one must navigate the "supervision" requirements.

Stark generally defers to the Medicare billing rules on the level of supervision required, although it does specify that the physician(s) who must supply the appropriate level of supervision for billing must be either the physician who orders the test or another physician in the same group practice. The levels of supervision required by the billing rules are something I have to revisit each time I'm faced with this issue for a client. My head is beginning to hurt just laying this much out, and I'm doing it primarily to hear from others on your thoughts on this subject.

The soundest advice I can give is that if you want to give direct credit to any physician for technical revenues, you might want to retain legal counsel experienced in the Stark law as it applies to physician practices to ensure that whatever compensation formulas/methods you devise will be Stark compliant.

July 18, 2009

Make sure getting off call schedule is addressed

Make sure your physician employment agreements address when a physician can request to be removed from the call schedule and any related reductions to his or her compensation. Most groups I see either require a length of service requirement to get off call or when a physician reaches a certain age. The penalty for coming off call is usually a 20-30% reduction in compensation, depending of course on the medical specialty and the intensity of getting called out after hours. Any reduction in compensation is divided equally among the physicians who remain on the call schedule.

June 17, 2009

Stark and allocation of ancillary income

Stark dictates that ancillary income cannot be allocated based on referrals to the ancillary service.  As long as the ancillary income distribution formula is set in advance, is not based on referrals, and is of reasonable duration, it should pass muster.  As an example, your group could agree in advance that all physicians, including those who are not partners will share ancillary income (you could even say that 90% will be split by owners and 10% will be split by non-owners). 

 

A distribution formula that in essence produced the same result as distribution based on referrals would probably not pass a smell test.

 

Many physician group practices have gone the distribution by ownership route because it is easy and has already passed scrutiny by the feds, making it essentially a safe harbor.  It also tends to be more readily accepted by the physicians in the group as being fair since the equipment used is generally an equal asset of all owners.

 

If you haven’t looked at it in a while, make sure your group compensation formulary is in compliance with Stark. If you are looking for a good resource (it requires an annual fee), take a look at MGMA’s www.starkcompliance.com website.